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RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH. By Stuart M. Speiser. Roch-
ester, N.Y.: The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co. 1966. Pp.
xx, 1094, $28.50.
Stuart M. Speiser, a nationally known trial lawyer and legal
author,' has just published a very comprehensive, highly informa-
tive, and exceedingly readable book entitled Recovery for Wrongful
Death.2 This volume is a "must" for the library of any law firm
engaged in the practice of trial and tort law.
The reasons for writing the treatise, which the author tells us
was six years in the making,' were twofold.4 First, although the
transcript of a very fine seminar on wrongful death has been pub-
lished' and there are many detailed annotations6 and law review
articles available,7 the last published book on wrongful death ap-
1 Mr. Speiser, a former military and commercial airplane pilot, has specialized in avi-
ation law for more than sixteen years. He has served as consulting counsel in most of
the nation's major air disasters during this period, and as a result he has had to deal in
actual litigation with the wrongful death statutes of most of the fifty states. Mr. Speiser
is a member of the New York and Connecticut Bars and a Fellow of the International
Academy of Law and Science and of the International Society of Barristers. He has lec-
tured extensively at law schools and bar associations in all parts of the country and is
the author of numerous books and articles.
2 SPEimSER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH (1966).
3 Speiser, Preface to id. at V.
4 Conference with Alfred Gans, formerly of Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Com-
pany and now a member of the author's firm, in New York, New York, Nov. 7, 1966.
WRONGFUL DEATH AND SuRvivoassip (Beall ed. 1958).
6 Admissibility in Wrongful Death Action of Photograph of Decedent Made in His
Lifetime, 74 A.L.R.2d 928 (1960); Admissibility in Wrongful Death Action of Testi-
mony of Actuary or Mathematician for Purpose of Establishing Present Worth of Pecu-
niary Loss, 79 A.L.R.2d 259 (1961); Conflict of Laws as to Survival or Revival of
Wrongful Death Actions Against Estate or Personal Representative of Wrongdoer, 17
A.L.R.2d 690 (1951); Damages for Wrongful Death of Husband or Father as Affected
by Receipt of Social Security Benefits, 84 A.L.R.2d 764 (1962); Effect of Death of
Beneficiary Upon Right of Action Under Death Statute, 43 A.L.R.2d 1291 (1955);
Pension, Retirement Income, Social Security Payments, and the Like, of Deceased, as
Affecting Recovery in Wrongful Death Action, 81 A.L.R.2d 949 (1962); Power of
Court, in Action Under Foreign Wrongful Death Statute, To Decline Jurisdiction on
Ground of Inconvenience of Forum, 48 A.L.R.2d 850 (1956); Right of Recovery, Un-
der Wrongful Death Statute, for Benefit of Illegitimate Child or Children of Decedent,
72 A.LR.2d 1235 (1960); Recovery of Nominal Damages in a Wrongful Death Ac-
tion, 69 A.L.R.2d 678 (1960); Remarriage of Surviving Spouse, or Possibility Thereof,
as Affecting Action of Wrongful Death of Deceased Spouse, 87 A.L.R.2d 252 (1963);
Retroactive Effect of a Statute Changing Manner and Method of Distribution of Re-
covery or Settlement for Wrongful Death, 66 A.L.R.2d 1444 (1959).
7 Traci, Law and Logic: Conflict in Ohio's Wrongful Death Statute, 4 CLEV.-MAR.
L. REV. 38 (1955); Comment, Action Brought by Administratrix To Recovery for
Wrongful Death of Prenatally Ingured Child, 38 B.U.L. REv. 166 (1958); Comment,
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peared some fifty-four years ago.' The pressing need for a mod-
ern work on the subject can be appreciated when it is realized
that accidents are the fourth 'leading cause of death in the United
States, exceeded only by heart disease, cancer, and vascular lesions.
For the population group between the ages of one and thirty-seven,
accidents rank not fourth but first as the greatest cause of death.
We have now reached a point where fifty thousand persons a year
lose their lives in automobile accidents alone, and well over 100,000
a year die from accidents of all kinds
Thus, in a ten-year period, over one million Americans either
have or will lose their lives through accidental injuries. Every con-
ceivable type of factual situation and conduct is involved, and no
age group or class of persons is immune."0 For example, on October
14, between the hours of 9 a.m. and 10 a.m, a man in New York
was pinned under the wreckage of his car after a head-on collision.
Attempts to free him proved futile. In California a young house-
wife, during that same hour, lit a cigarette near a defective gas
regulator which had been installed by a public utility company the
day before. There was an explosion that resulted in her death. In
a small Texas town, a tractor-trailer jumped the light and killed a
twenty-five year-old electrician who was a pedestrian. In Michigan
before 10:00 that morning a small boy was fatally shot by an eager
hunter. During that hour, in Florida a student pilot attempting to
solo lost control of his plane and crashed. Seven other people per-
ished in accidents between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. on this date, an aver-
age that has been repeated every hour of every day in the United
States."
Experience has shown that the vast majority of these public as
well as private tragedies result in claims or litigation for wrongful
death. As the publisher of Mr. Speiser's book states: "Life is uncer-
tain, but death when it is wrongful, is now certain to be sued."'"
Wrongful Death Actions: Limitations on Amount Recoverable, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 637
(1961); Comment, New Measure of Recovery for Wrongful Death of Minor, 22 OHIo
ST. LJ. 422 (1961); Comment, Lex Pori vs. Lex Fori Delicit - Misuse of Substance-
Procedure and Public Policy Concepts, 15 RUTGERS L. REV. 620 (1961); Comment,
Measure of Damages for Wrongful Death of a Minor Child, WASH. & LEE L. REV. 277
(1961); Note, Injuries to the Unborn - A Legal-Medical Problem, 9 W. RES. L. REv.
499 (1958).
8 TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL Acr (2d ed. 1913).
9 AmERCANA 1966 ANNUA. Accidents 22 (1966).
101 ENCYC. AmmicANA Accidents 72 (1965).
1 1 Paul G. White, Director, Special Services, The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing
Company, Rochester, New York.
1 2 News Release, Aug. 1, 1966.
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With this in mind, as stated before, the practicing attorney's need
for a first-class treatise in this area of the law becomes readily appar-
ent. It was in part to answer this need that Mr. Speiser entered
upon a "labor of love."' 3
The second and equally compelling reason for writing Recovery
for Wrongful Death was the feeling of the author, gleaned through
his vast experience with air-crash cases throughout the United States,
not only that the law on wrongful death ought to be gathered in
one volume but also that the injustice and inequities in this area of
the law should be pointed up in the hope that judges, lawyers, and
legislators might do something to remedy these wrongs. 4
The reasons for these inequities and injustices are historical and
were spawned by the common law. It should be remembered that
at common law there was no right of recovery for the death of a
human being who had been killed by the negligence or wrongful
act of another. As one writer has expressed it, "Compressed into
one sentence, at common law death did not create liability: rather,
death extinguished liability."' 5  Furthermore, under the common
law, tort actions involving injury but not death likewise failed to
survive the subsequent but unrelated death of either the plaintiff or
the defendant.'"
The shocking rule that the infliction of death was not a tort
against the deceased or his bereaved dependents was first laid down
in 1808 by Lord Ellenborough in Baker v. Bolton,7 a nisi prius
ruling without a single supporting authority."8 The net result was
that it was cheaper to kill a man than to maim, scratch, or bruise
him.'9 Like other elements of the common law, Baker v. Bolton
was imported into and embraced by the American courts.
13 See Conference with Alfred Gans, supra note 4.
14 Ibid.
15 Lambert, History and Future, in WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVORSHIP 3 (Beall
ed. 1958).
16 Death no longer extinguishes liability or claims in tort, as nearly all jurisdictions
in the United States have enacted statutes called survival acts. These statutes are dealt
with by the author in chapter 14.
17Baker v. Bolton, Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
18 This same Lord Ellenborough a year later in Butterfield v. Forrester (1809)
enunciated the rule of contributory negligence, one of the most influential
doctrines in the entire field of law and one of the harshest in its application.
The slightest lapse from ordinary care on the part of the plaintiff will com-
pletely bar recovery for his injuries no matter how flagrant the negligence of
the defendant may be. THE TRIAL OF THE FUTURE (1965).
19 As Dean Prosser, tongue in cheek, tells us, "most lawyers are familiar with the
legend, quite unfounded, that this was the original reason that passengers in Pullman car
berths rode with their heads to the front. Also that fire axes in railroad coaches were
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However, as the industrial revolution gained momentum, the
intolerable result of Baker v. Bolton became the object of legislative
reform both in England and the United States. In 1846 the old
common law rule was abrogated in England by the Fatal Accidents
Act,20 commonly known as Lord Campbell's Act. A year later in
1847 the first statute of this kind was passed in the United States,2
and, today, every American state has a remedy for wrongful death.
Although there is not complete uniformity, most of the acts are
patterned after Lord Campbell's Act and create a new cause of action
in favor of the decedent's personal representative for the benefit of
certain specified persons. All of these acts are collected both in
detail and in summary form in Speiser's book. In this day and
age of an extremely mobile population throughout the several states
this compilation itself is worth the price, of the book. This section
of the treatise has been aptly described as a "small portable li-
brary,"2 and indeed it is.
Insofar as the inequities and injustices remain in the law of
wrongful death, it has been aptly stated that the "cold hand of that
transcendant Tory Lord Ellenborough, will remain raised in partial
victory."" As noted before, spotlighting these areas was the second
compelling reason for this book, that is, "to also state the law as
it ought to be and not only as it is."'25  More specifically, the prob-
lems discussed in full by Mr. Speiser are: (1) the archaic limitation
of death awards established either by state statutes, constitutional
prohibitions, or treaties of the federal government; (2) the grossly
inadequate awards for the death of minor children, housewives, or
children yet unborn; (3) the injustice to the next of kin when dam-
ages of the deceased husband or father are limited to his pecuniary
contribution to his family, while accumulations to his estate through
thrift or wise investments are excluded as an element of damage.
Recovery for Wrongful Death, however, is also a practical "how
to do it" book. 6 This practical knowledge arose from the author's
provided to enable the conductor to deal efficiently with those who were merely injured."
PROSSER, TORTs § 121, at 924 nA2 (3d ed. 1964).
20 9 & 10 Vict c. 93.
21 SPEISER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 13.
2 2 Id. at apps. A & B.
23 See Conference with Alfred Gans, supra note 4.
2 4 Spangenberg, Proof of Damages for Wrongful Death, in WRONGFUL DEATH AND
SURVIVORsHIP 63, 65 (Beall ed. 1958).
25 See Conference with Alfred Gans, supra note 4.
0 Examples of testimony appear throughout the book as well as examples of special
instructions, use of tables and diagrams, and examples of suggested solutions to specific
problems.
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long association and active participation in the "how-to-do-it semi-
nars" and conventions of the American Trial Lawyers Association.27
It was also acquired from his vast experience in air-crash cases
wherein the victims are invariably killed and the loss to their heirs
and next of kin is very substantial due to the fact that a great ma-
jority of the air travelers are either business executives or profes-
sional men. While Speiser's book covers all relevant 8 subjects, the
primary emphasis is on damages and how to prove them in specific
factual situations.2" The text material is buttressed with exhaustive
citations to decisions from the several states and the federal courts,
as well as with numerous key references to American Jurisprudence
2d "Proof of Facts"; American Jurisprudence 2d "Trial"; American
Jurisprudence Pleading and Proof "Forms"; and annotations in
American Law Reports 2d. The leading cases in the field of wrong-
ful death, such as Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,3" Long v. Pan
Am. World Airways,"' and Wycko v. Knotke,2 as well as lost in-
heritance cases and the housewife cases are all fully discussed by
the author.
The inside back cover of Recovery for Wrongful Death is
equipped to receive a pocket part in the future,' and materials are
already being assembled by the author for that purpose.34 This re-
viewer suggests that the pocket part make three additions to the
basic text. One would be a list of names and addresses of persons
who qualify as experts in the several states to testify on the various
elements necessary to prove damages, as outlined in chapters 3 and
4. Second, would be samples or examples of effective final argu-
ments in actual cases, also in connection with chapters 3 and 4.
Third, would be additional discussion and material concerning the
practical reasons for chosing the forum in which to bring the initial
2 7 Mr. Speiser has been the National Chairman of the American Trial Lawyers As-
sociation's Aviation Law Committee (1955-58) and is currently an Associate Editor in
Aviation Law for the American Trial Lawyers Association Law Journal.
28 The text covers basis of liability, defense, pleading and practice, evidence, stat-
utes, and decisions.
29 Chapters 3 and 4, entitled "Damages" and "Specific Situations," respectively, en-
compasse 355 pages, which is approximately one half the number of pages devoted to
textual material.
30309 F.2d 553 (1962).
31 17 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965).
32361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960).
33 The publisher, in its news release on the date of publication, August 1, 1966,
stated its intention to keep the basic text current through periodical supplementation.
34 Conference with Alfred Gans, supra note 4.
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law suit. Should the action be brought in a federal or state court?
And, if in a state court, which one?
This reviewer's conclusion, however, has already been stated at
the outset of the review - Recovery for Wrongful Death is a
"must" volume for the library of any law firm engaged in the
practice of trial and tort law.
NORMAN W. SHIBLEY*
SouTHERN JUSTICE. Edited by Leon Friedman. New York:
Pantheon Books. 1965. Pp. ix, 306. $5.95.
Anyone who has served time as a volunteer attorney in the South
must expect to leave permanently touched by his experiences there.
The authors of sixteen of the seventeen essays in this volume were
volunteers in various places in the South at various times in 1964
and before. Their experiences moved them deeply - or so it would
appear from the style and content of these articles.
With the notable exception of the concluding article by Profes-
sor Lusky, which is the book's only reprint, all of the articles are,
existential in form; they relate the actual experiences of the authors
in the courts and cities of the South. They speak from an "observa-
tion-post" acquaintance with the system of southern justice in its
day-to-day operation from the policeman on the street to the judge
in the trial and appellate courts, both state and federal. Although
the authors' experiences might have been few or short-lived in view
of the limited duration of their exposure to southern justice, they
were consistently telling and fully deserved retelling.
This book is troubling for the same reasons that the grim re-
minders recounted in it are startling. It raises more questions, some
of them quite fundamental, than it answers. It asks us to believe
that a sponsored, organized sociological field trip to Alabama by a
group of college students accompanied by their professor can become
a nightmare of prisons and appeals, all because the group had the
audacity to chat, in an unobtrusive way, with Negroes in a Negro-
owned restaurant in a Negro area.1 It asks us to believe that the
traffic laws and the authority of the police were perverted in order
to prevent a white civil rights volunteer from an Iowa college from
transporting books to rural freedom schools.2 It asks us to believe
*Member of the Ohio Bar.
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that a volunteer civil rights attorney representing a Negro civil
rights worker who had been arrested on a spurious charge of va-
grancy and convicted without benefit of counsel would find all four-
teen lawyers in Sunflower County, Mississippi, unavailable, afraid,
or unwilling to assist him in the mundane task of obtaining visita-
tion privileges at the county farm where his client was confined.3
Incredible as these individual tales are to those unfamiliar with
the southern way of doing justice, the book proffers them as merely
illustrative of a much wider problem and as the vaguest preliminary
for a sweeping generalization which taxes credulity to the utmost.
The reader is asked to believe, for example, that the reluctance of the
Sunflower County Bar to assist one civil rights attorney signals and
proves "The Abdication of the Southern Bar"4 from its responsibility
to represent persons charged with unpopular offenses. Charles
Morgan, Jr., formerly a prominent member of the Birmingham,
Alabama Bar and author of one of the more thoughtful essays in
this volume,5 and, more recently, Paul Johnston, also a prominent
member of the Birmingham Bar who undertook to represent the
FBI informant who witnessed the killing of Mrs. Viola Liuzzo, are
living witnesses to the personal and professional disaster that any
southern attorney courts when he undertakes to defend the defense-
less civil rights worker. The notoriety given the professional mar-
tyrdom of Charles Morgan, Jr. and Paul Johnston exemplifies both
the dangers inherent in any interference by southern lawyers with
the southern brand of justice and the rarity of such interference.
Yet, the southern bar has had its defenders and, along the route,
the generalizations of this book have their opponents. The Chief
Justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court has recently written that
"although there may have been instances where individual members
of the Mississippi Bar declined representation in unpopular causes,
in my opinion these have been the exception not the rule."' Chief
Justice Ethridge's view is supported by Semmes Luckett,7 a Clarks-
dale, Mississippi, lawyer whose attitudes are well known to most
1 Durr, Sociology and the Law: A Field Trip to Montgomery, Alabama, in SouH-
mN JUsncE 43-56 (Friedman ed. 1965).
2 Braiterman, Harold and the Highwaymen, in id. at 88-102.
3 Oppenheim, The Abdication of the Southern Bar, in id. at 127-35.
4Id. at 135.
5 Morgan, Segregated Justice, in id. at 15 5-64.
6 Ethridge, Passion and Prejudice, 37 MIss. L.J. 397, 398 (1966). (Emphasis added.)
7 Lucketr, Clarksdale Customs, 37 MiSs. L.J. 419, 422 (1966).
[Vol. 18: 739
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civil rights attorneys. Mr. Luckett has unearthed a list of cases in
which Mississippi lawyers willingly defended Negroes charged with
various heinous felonies in the state courts of Mississippi. From
this compilation, he draws the remarkably illogical conclusion that
if Mississippi lawyers will accept court appointments (as if they had
any choice in the matter) to represent Negroes charged with fel-
onies, they must certainly be willing'to accept the "piddling," "con-
temptable" [sicl8 case of a civil rights worker (where they have all
the freedom of choice imaginable).
Others have expressed a more reasoned and fully documented case
regarding "The Abdication of the Southern Bar" than that expressed
by Chief Justice Ethridge and Mr. Luckett.9 But the best support
for the generalization that the southern bar has willfully defaulted
in its professional responsibilities to the unpopular defendant is the
long and lengthening list of those attorneys who have volunteered
their time and abilities to fill the void left by the southern bar. As
St. Paul went into Macedonia, so these volunteer lawyers have
heeded the cry of the southern Negro for assistance. If there were
no need for them, they would not be there. And the need stems
not from the multiplicity of cases but from the reluctance of the
southern bar to act in them.
In a sense this reluctance is understandable, in view of what is
demanded of a lawyer by his civil rights clients. It is not unusual
for the lawyer to be asked to address a civil rights rally prior to a
civil rights demonstration. The lawyer is expected to detail the
legal requirements for a peaceable and lawful demonstration, or the
lawyer may be asked to be on the scene with advice and protection
for a group of picketers. This is not the office or courtroom
lawyer's usual fare. Nor is it a role reasonably calculated to avoid
the public stigma of affiliation with and support of the dient's
cause. It is therefore understandable, albeit inexcusable, for the
southern bar to cower before its obvious professional obligations.
Thus far the questions posed by this book have been of the gar-
den variety. We are asked to believe that generalizations concern-
ing the present state of southern justice can reasonably be deduced
from specific instances of injustice. And if our credibility falters in
this enterprise, we are asked: Would you believe, at least, that the
tales we tell did in fact happen as we tell them? And, regarding
8 Id. at 423.
9 Griswold, The Report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights,'in LAw
ENFORCEMENT 182 (1965).
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that question, there is little dispute or, for that matter, little need
for it. Even Chief Justice Ethridge is willing to give his assent to
the existence of injustice in Mississippi - as the exception."
However, these essays qua narratives hew too closely to the
theme of injustice in the South and, in doing so, fail completely to
mention another ingredient of southern justice, which may rightly
be considered a by-product of it and which may wrongly be con-
strued as good cause for commending it. I refer to the strength of
purpose and courage of character which southern injustice, like in-
justice anywhere, has aroused and revealed in the hearts and conduct
of its victims. This book memorializes the wrongs of the oppressors
rather than the will of the oppressed to resist and overcome these
wrongs. The emphasis is unfortunate.
I remember three occasions upon which this will to resist was
manifested with such poignancy as to make the onlooker's heart
sing. One involved a fifteen-year-old boy; another, an aged and
ailing Negro mother, and the third, a group, a song, and a promise.
One day in June of 1965 Eugene Young stood in the makeshift
courtroom of Hinds County Juvenile Court before Judge Carl E.
Guernsey; the defendant was charged with an act of delinquency, to
wit, parading without a permit in the streets of Jackson, Mississippi.
Gene was, at fifteen, a professional civil rights activist. He had
been the first to integrate the barber shops of Kansas City. For
that he received a shave instead of a haircut and a front page picture
in a leading national weekly portraying his cheerful humiliation.
Gene's experiences had given him the courage and ability to resist
Judge Guernsey's vigorous cross-examination. His youth gave him
the wit to conquer it.
As I recall it, the examination proceeded as follows:
"We know each other, don't we Gene?" began Judge Guernsey.
"Yes, Judge" was Gene's barely audible reply.
Emboldened by Gene's evident docility, the Judge became more
direct.
"You were before me once before for attempting to integrate a
park, isn't that so?"
"No, Judge," said Gene, lifting his head ever so slightly.
"You mean to say you've never been in this court before?" said
the puzzled judge.
"Yes, I've been here before, Judge."
10 Ethridge, sapra note 6, at 398.
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"Well, that's settled then. And wasn't your previous appear-
ance here for attempting to integrate a park?"
"No, Judge."
"You mean to say you never entered that park?" the Judge, now
worried, replied.
"Oh, yes Judge, I did," Gene said, his self-confidence showing.
'Well, you went there to integrate it, didn't you?" said the
Judge.
"Why, then did you go there?" said the Judge, at last exas-
perated.
Gene hesitated, undoubtedly for effect more than for courage,
looked about him, smiled ever so slightly and respectfully and said,
"I went there to play, Judge."
In this brief encounter, a fifteen-year-old had summed up the
essential difference between riot and right, between provocation and
freedom and all in a few well-chosen, dramatically timed, and nicely
disguised words of whimsy. Although fifteen years old, Gene
Young was no boy. Nor was he only a man. He was more. He
was, as the Eskimos say of those they revere, an Inuk - a man,
pre-eminently.
And then there was an old - or she might have been middle-
aged or even young for all that the ravages of a southern Negro's
way of life pander to appearances - woman whose name is now
beyond recall but whose memory is unforgettable.
We met one evening, again in June of 1965, at the fairgrounds
in Jackson, Mississippi. At the time, I was performing the then
daily task of completing retainer forms for those demonstrators who
were newly arrived at the fairgrounds detention center. The infor-
mation she gave me was characteristic of that given by so many be-
fore her - an unemployed cotton picker with no savings and no
prior involvement in demonstrations but with a large and fatherless
family to support.
After completing the form, I inquired whether she had any ill-
nesses which might require attention during her confinement or
which might, if grave enough, enable us to secure her immediate
release without bail. As she spoke, informing me unemotionally
that she was an insulin diabetic who had recently undergone major
surgery, I realized that we had met before. During the remainder
of the interview, I was struck by her unusual reluctance to claim her
1967]
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illnesses as an excuse from confinement, and I was perplexed by the
vague familiarity of her face.
Finally, I asked if we had met before. "Yes," she said. And,
suddenly, I remembered. We had met the day before, when she
had come to the fairgrounds in order to secure the release of her two
teen-age children, had appeared before Judge Guernsey, and had
promised that her children would not demonstrate in the future.
"But, where are your children?" I asked.
"At home," she replied.
"And how is it that you were out parading?" I inquired.
"Someones of us has gots to show which side we'se on," she
said, in a voice as reverent as if she were invoking a blessing before
meals.
And with that comment I grasped the key to her dedication.
Her commitment was religious in its sincerity and oath-like in its
solemnity, for she had paraded in order to call upon man to witness
the truth of what she did.
My third remembrance of Negro courage in action relates to an
occurrence shortly after the interview with this Negro woman. The
interviews with the new arrivals had been completed. Other de-
tainees, who had expressed a desire to do so, were then permitted to
speak with us. Many of them admitted their not-insubstantial fear
of police brutality if they were left to fare for themselves at the
fairgrounds during the night. We appreciated their problem but
were powerless to demand the right to remain in order to safeguard
them. One possible solace we could offer but which, in charity, we
did not put forward was the thought of suicide which, according to
Nietzsche, "is a great consolation; with the help of it, one has got
through many a bad night."'1
All interviews completed, I collected my papers and, in com-
pany with Professor John Honnold of the University of Pennsyl-
vania Law School, made ready to leave. The sun was collapsing
behind the nearest half of the detention huts. The detainees had
been fed their usual meatless meal. The police guard was changing
and, with the change, came the swagger, the stick, and the tape-
covered badge. Voices could be heard softly chanting the civil
rights anthem, "We Shall Overcome." As if restrained by an un-
seen hand, John and I stopped and gazed into the detention quarters.
Through the doorway, I imagined that I saw the sun's dying rays
stop lengthening, the menacing police cease menacing, and the
11NEITZcHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL 88 (Great Books Foundation 1947).
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whirling world at rest. If ever taps was sounded, it never was more
stirring than this rendition of "We Shall Overcome" at that mo-
ment. There, in that quiet place, there, in that fearful place, cour-
age, sufficient unto the night, had spoken. And Nietzche was
proved to be wrong, for courage, not fear, will out.
In these three recollections of the courage of the young, the old,
and the many, we can perceive the answer to the most agonizing
problem raised by the essays in this book, namely, is there any hope
for change in the system of southern justice portrayed here? How
says the Delphic Oracle?
Although the Fifth Circuit has stood firm in its support for
Negro rights and although the maximum resources of the federal
government are still untapped, due largely to self-imposed restraints,
the answer to the Negro's quest for equality lies neither in the Fifth
Circuit nor in the federal government. They are only supportive.
The ultimate resolution lies in the spunk of a fifteen-year-old boy,
the dedication of an ailing but determined woman, and the song of
the suppressed masses. This prediction, unlike the reply of the
Delphic Oracle to Croesus, unambiguously affirms the strength of
unblanched courage to overcome adversity and even oppression. It
is disappointing that the essayists in Southern Justice did not do the
same.
JAMES E. STARRS*
Associate Professor of Law. The George Washington University.
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